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In 1996, Daniel Chovan was convicted in California state court of a 
misdemeanor that did not involve a gun.1  After inflicting corporal 
injury on his spouse, Cheryl Fix, he was sentenced to 120 days in jail 
and three years of supervised release.2  Although Chovan did not use 
a firearm in committing the offense, he was banned from possessing a 
gun for the rest of his life under a federal statute applicable only to 
persons convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence crimes.3  
Chovan challenged the law as an unconstitutional infringement of his 
Second Amendment rights.4  In evaluating Chovan’s case, the Ninth 
Circuit was faced with a problem: what standard of review should 
apply to Chovan’s constitutional claim?5  Absent clear guidance from 
the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit was left to choose its own 
standard.6  Even though the Ninth Circuit found that the federal 
statute substantially burdened Chovan’s Second Amendment rights, it 
opted to grant the federal government moderate deference, and 
applied intermediate scrutiny.7  After examining the regulation 
through this lens, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute was 
constitutional.8  Thus, without any approval from the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                             
 1. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1129–30. 
 5. Id. at 1134. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. at 1138. 
 8. Id. at 1130, 1142. 
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regarding its methodology, the Chovan court both independently 
selected a standard of review for a constitutional challenge and 
upheld severely burdensome legislation by virtue of its choice. 
Chovan is not an isolated example of constitutional confusion.  In 
fact, it is simply the most recent example of the legal debate 
surrounding the proper standard of review for the Second 
Amendment.  The proper analytical framework for statutes 
challenged as an unconstitutional infringement on individual Second 
Amendment rights after District of Columbia v. Heller has emerged 
as both a hotly contested and imprecise zone of jurisprudence for 
lower courts.9  As an increasing number of Second Amendment cases 
wend through the federal system, these courts have been faced with 
two types of challenged gun statutes.  This Note defines those two 
types as statutes that “prohibit” and those that “limit.”  “Prohibiting” 
statutes constitute blanket bans on certain weapons or materials, and 
include regulations like the District of Columbia (District) handgun 
ban struck down in Heller.10  “Limiting” statutes create regulations on 
certain types of weapons or related activities, such as concealed carry 
laws or purchase restrictions.11  Prohibiting statutes are immediately 
more suspect after Heller, which explicitly decried legislation 
“ban[ning] . . . an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen 
by American society” as an unconstitutional restriction on the right to 
keep and bear arms.12  But because the Court failed to specify a level 
of scrutiny for Second Amendment claims in any form, ruling upon 
both types of legislation has presented a complicated task for lower 
courts.13 
In Heller’s wake, two opposing points of view have emerged 
regarding its proper application in both categorizing statutes affecting 
the Second Amendment and in classifying their constitutionality.  
Part I of this Note traces the development of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to the Second Amendment both before and immediately 
after the Heller decision.  Part II examines the evolution of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence since Heller, and posits that legislation 
regulating high-capacity magazines represents a markedly gray area 
for judges outlining the contours of the right to keep and bear arms.  
Part II also outlines the analytical options for courts faced with 
                                                                                                                             
 9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Heller I). 
 10. See id. at 573. 
 11. Cf. Nicholas J. Johnson, Administering the Second Amendment: Law, 
Politics, and Taxonomy, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2010). 
 12 554 U.S. at 628; cf. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1264. 
 13. 554 U.S. at 634–35. 
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Second Amendment challenges that have developed since Heller.  
The majority of courts faced with Second Amendment issues have 
opted to pursue a two-step, balancing analysis.  First, courts choosing 
this method decide whether the statute regulates conduct that falls 
within the scope of the Second Amendment.14  If so, the court then 
engages in some level of heightened scrutiny of the regulation, which 
emerges almost invariably as a type of intermediate scrutiny.15  
Alternatively, a small group of justices led by Judge Brett Kavanaugh 
of the D.C. Circuit16 have rejected the use of balancing tests as 
inconsistent with Heller.  Instead, these judges rely upon the 
“common use test” delineated in Heller, and employ an evaluation of 
the text, history, and tradition of the challenged statute and the 
Second Amendment.17 
Part III of this Note uses high-capacity magazine regulations as a 
test case for the application of both methodologies, and finds that the 
approach recommended by Judge Kavanaugh is the preferable 
option.  Because the Kavanaugh approach avoids the judicial interest-
balancing so disfavored by the Supreme Court in Second Amendment 
cases, this Note concludes that Judge Kavanaugh’s analysis is the 
proper choice for courts faced with Second Amendment challenges.  
This Note arrives at this result because the Kavanaugh approach is 
flexible, predictable, easy to apply, and faithful to the core principles 
articulated by the Supreme Court. 
I.  THE CONTOURS OF MODERN SECOND AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE: FROM MILLER TO HELLER 
A. Second Amendment Jurisprudence Before 2008 
The words of Heller are familiar to all Second Amendment 
scholars, although they have managed to produce a breathtaking 
divergence of interpretation.  Before Heller’s issuance in 2008, courts 
interpreted Second Amendment cases almost solely through the lens 
of the canonical case United States v. Miller.18  In Miller, the U.S. 
                                                                                                                             
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 97.  Courts utilizing an interest-balancing test must necessarily 
apply some form of heightened scrutiny because Heller rejected the use of rational 
basis review for Second Amendment cases. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
 16. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 17. See, e.g., Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–19 (N.D. Ill. 
2012). 
 18. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
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Supreme Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the interstate 
transport of short-barreled shotguns, declaring that possession or use 
of this type of firearm bore “no reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”19  The Miller 
Court determined that the Second Amendment should be interpreted 
and applied with a careful eye to the continuation and effectiveness of 
state militias.20  Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority, defined 
a militia as “comprised [of] all males physically capable of acting in 
concert for the common defense” who were “expected to appear 
bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use 
at the time.”21  As such, lower court opinions expound upon the 
connection between the Second Amendment and its historical 
application to the state militias referenced in Miller, and generally 
limit the scope of weapons protected under the amendment to those 
generally utilized at the time of its passage.22  However, the Miller 
opinion was also notoriously “opaque and open-ended,” and seemed 
to raise more questions than it answered about the scope of the 
Second Amendment.23 
For the next seven decades, state and federal courts failed to agree 
upon a uniform evaluation of Miller’s meaning.24  Some embraced a 
“state’s right” theory, interpreting Miller to mean that the Second 
Amendment protected states in the maintenance of their militias 
against possible interference by the federal government.25  These 
courts held that individuals lack standing to challenge gun legislation, 
because an individual right to keep and bear arms does not exist.26  
Other courts, in contrast, adopted a “collective right” approach, and 
held that the Second Amendment protected only the collective 
possession of arms bearing a reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.27 
                                                                                                                             
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 179. 
 22. See Brannon Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court 
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. 
REV. 961, 975–76 (1996). 
 23. See Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 353 (2009). 
 24. Id. at 354. 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942). 
 26. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 27. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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Most courts considering the issue utilized some form of rational 
basis review when evaluating firearm regulations.28  Gun regulations 
were upheld in almost every instance in the wake of the Miller 
decision.29  But historical interpretation of Miller did not garner 
universal acceptance.  For instance, scholar Brannon Denning argued 
over ten years before the Heller decision that applying Miller to deny 
an individual’s right to keep and bear firearms “strayed so far from 
the Court’s original holding to the point of being intellectually 
dishonest.”30   If the Court truly intended to limit the use and 
possession of firearms to a militia, Denning contended, the case 
would have been disposed of on standing grounds, because the 
defendants in the case were not militia members.31  Had the Miller 
Court foreclosed an individual right to bear arms, he argued, the 
replacement of state militias with the National Guard would render 
the Second Amendment, like the Third Amendment, “little more 
than an anachronistic curiosity.”32 
B. District of Columbia v. Heller: A Novel Approach 
Faced with the opportunity to redraw the boundaries of the Second 
Amendment, the Heller Court put some of the questions raised by 
Miller to rest and issued the seminal decision regarding prohibition 
statutes under the Second Amendment.33  Petitioner Dick Heller 
challenged a District law prohibiting the registration of handguns and 
requiring residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and 
disassembled or bound by trigger lock or a similar device.34  Relying 
primarily on First Amendment jurisprudence, the Government 
recommended that the Supreme Court adopt a standard of 
intermediate scrutiny when evaluating gun control legislation.35  At 
                                                                                                                             
 28. Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and 
McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1136 (2011). 
 29. Id. at 1134 (citing Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 683, 718 (2007)). 
 30. Denning, supra note 22, at 962–63. 
 31. Id. at 975. 
 32. Id. at 996. 
 33. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2010) (holding that “[t]here seems to us no doubt, 
on the basis of text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right to keep and bear arms”); see Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of 
Review in a Heller World, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617, 1618 (2012). 
 34. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 570.  The law also made it a crime to carry an unlicensed 
handgun, but authorized the police chief to issue one-year licenses to do so.  Heller, a 
special policeman, applied to register a handgun to keep in his home, but the District 
denied his request. 
 35. Lund, supra note 33, at 1618. 
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oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts expressed skepticism that a 
balancing test was appropriate for Second Amendment analysis, 
stating: 
[T]hese various phrases under the different standards that are 
proposed, “compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly 
tailored,” none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder 
why in this case we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard.  
Isn’t it enough to determine the scope of the existing right that the 
amendment refers to, look at the various regulations that were 
available at the time, including you can’t take the gun to the 
marketplace and all that, and determine how . . . . this restriction and 
the scope of this right looks in relation to those?  I’m not sure why 
we have to articulate some very intricate standard.  I mean, these 
standards that apply in the First Amendment just kind of developed 
over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked 
up.  But I don’t know why when we are starting afresh, we would try 
to articulate a whole standard that would apply in every case?36 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reflected Justice Roberts’s 
concern and declined to articulate a standard to be applied in every 
Second Amendment case.37  Nor did the Court establish any 
consistent standard to be utilized when evaluating the right to keep 
and bear arms. 
Rather than articulate a standard of review for the Second 
Amendment, the Heller Court instead struck down the District’s 
regulation because it prohibited an entire class of firearms 
overwhelmingly chosen by Americans for the lawful purpose of self-
defense.38  The Court reached this conclusion by engaging in “the 
most exacting historical inquiry into any question concerning the right 
to keep and bear arms.”39  Justice Scalia concluded that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense by exhaustively examining three distinct sources: the 
amendment’s text, the history behind its enactment, and its traditional 
                                                                                                                             
 36. Id. at 1618-19 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller I, 554 U.S. 
570 (2008) (No. 07-290), available at www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/07-290.pdf). 
 37. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 38. See Lund, supra note 33, at 1619. 
 39. Darrell A. H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh 
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 861–62 (2013).  
The Heller decision has also been characterized by scholars as one of the most 
exacting exercises of originalism ever undertaken by the Supreme Court. See, .e.g., 
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 249 
(2008). 
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interpretation.40  The challenged statute, he opined, did not require 
the application of any standard of scrutiny traditionally applied to 
enumerated constitutional rights (rational basis review, intermediate 
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny), because it would fail them all.41  He 
further classified rational basis review (the standard favored by courts 
in the wake of Miller) as particularly inappropriate, arguing that 
[Rational basis review] could not be used to evaluate the extent to 
which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right . . . . If 
all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms 
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant 
with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and 
would have no effect.42 
By engaging in a textual, historical, and traditional method of 
analysis, rather than adhering to the open-ended balancing test 
recommended by the government, Heller also implicitly rejected the 
application of intermediate or strict scrutiny to prohibition cases.43 
C. Heller’s Limits: Presumptively Lawful Regulations and the 
Common Use Test 
The Heller majority dismissed the notion of an unlimited Second 
Amendment right.44  Two primary restrictions upon the right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense emerge from the decision, both hinging 
upon the amendment’s history, traditional application, and 
interpretation.  The first restriction preserves a set of “longstanding” 
prohibitions on firearm possession, which Justice Scalia categorized as 
“presumptively lawful.”45  The opinion specifically includes in this 
category “prohibitions on [possession] by felons and the mentally ill, 
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.”46  Scalia was careful to note that the list of presumptively 
lawful regulations was not exhaustive, leaving room for additions or 
                                                                                                                             
 40. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 595; Miller, supra note 39, at 856.  Justice Scalia further 
described this right as reaching its apex in the home. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 41. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 42. Id. at 628 n.27. 
 43. See E. Garret Barlow, United States v. Reese and Post-Heller Second 
Amendment Interpretation, 2012 BYU L. REV. 391, 405; Lund, supra note 33, at 
1628. 
 44. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 45. Id. at 626–27 n.26; see Alexander C. Barrett, Taking Aim at Felony 
Possession, 93 B.U. L. REV. 163, 171–72 (2013). 
 46. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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slight alterations.47  As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, the 
existence of this list appears to foreclose the application of strict 
scrutiny to laws burdening individual Second Amendment rights.48  
The majority’s explicit approval of a given set of regulations “whose 
constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from 
clear,” he argued, would make the true application of strict scrutiny to 
Second Amendment cases “impossible.”49  Breyer sharply criticized 
the majority’s failure to articulate a standard, and rejected Scalia’s 
focus on text, history, and tradition.50  Further, he recommended that 
the Court employ an interest-balancing inquiry in Second 
Amendment cases similar to the type utilized in free speech and 
election law cases.51 
The second limitation articulated in Heller delineates the scope of 
weapons protected under the Second Amendment.52  To honor the 
historical restriction on the possession of “dangerous and unusual 
weapons,” the Court upheld the common use standard first described 
in Miller.53  Thus, “the Second Amendment does not protect those 
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.”54  The precise meaning of the common use exception has 
become a topic of heated scholarly debate that implicates the vast 
advancement in firearms technology in previous centuries.55  Initially 
troubling is the proper definition of the phrase “at the time,” which 
could refer to two acceptable periods: the time of ratification of the 
Second Amendment or the modern day.56  Justice Scalia eliminated 
the first option in short order: 
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only 
those arms that existed in the [eighteenth] century are protected by 
the Second Amendment.  We do not interpret constitutional rights 
                                                                                                                             
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. at 688–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 686–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 627. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 625. 
 55. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1387–88 (2009); Michael S. Obermeier, Scoping Out the Limits 
of “Arms” Under the Second Amendment, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 681, 683 (2012); Mark 
Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Method and 
Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1439–40 (2009). 
 56. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 55, at 1387; see also Allen Rostron, Justice 
Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 703, 710–11 (2012). 
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that way.  Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of 
communications, and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern 
forms of search, the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all 
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not 
in existence at the time of the founding.57 
Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the Second Amendment 
quite clearly extends to protect modern weapons.  To rule otherwise 
would be to accept the absurd logic that “the ‘Armies’ Congress is 
authorized to raise can consist only of infantry marching on foot with 
antique black powder muskets . . . [a]nd the ‘Navy’ . . . that Congress 
is authorized to maintain would be a fleet of wooden sailing ships.”58 
D. Complications Posed by the Common Use Test 
Although the common use test seems to refer to weapons and 
technologies commonly owned in the modern day, this premise raises 
some critical complications.  First, who is the common user?  
American military organizations often use weapons that private 
citizens are unable to own or obtain for either home or public use.59  
This has led some scholars to argue that current military utility should 
serve as “both a necessary and sufficient” test for the constitutional 
protection of hand-carried weapons.60  Others argue that protected 
firearms should be both appropriate for military use, but also for 
common use by private citizens.61  The Supreme Court seemed to 
resolve this question in Heller by categorizing the common use 
exception as a “gloss on the historical tradition of prohibiting the 
carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.”62  The Court rejected 
the notion that the common user includes military organizations, a 
criterion it characterized as “startling” in its implications, and held 
that the arms protected by the Second Amendment are those in 
                                                                                                                             
 57. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 582 (internal citations omitted). 
 58. Lerner & Lund, supra note 55, at 1387. 
 59. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water (Mark)? 
Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 
1255 n.66 (2009); O’Shea, supra note 23, at 359. 
 60. See O’Shea, supra note 23, at 359. 
 61. See id.  During oral argument in Heller, Justice Scalia expressed preference 
for this kind of two-step analysis, though it was not ultimately adopted in the case. 
See id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Heller I, 554 U.S. at 570 (No. 07-
290), available at www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-
290.pdf). 
 62. O’Shea, supra note 23, at 368. 
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common use at the present time for both inherently private self-
defense and “other lawful purposes.”63 
The second complication raised by the common use test’s 
engagement with the present period is what scholars deem the 
“circularity problem.”64  By permitting national popularity and 
frequency of use to dictate a class of protected arms, the common use 
test “effectively empowers the government to create its own 
exceptions to the Second Amendment right so long as the Supreme 
Court waits awhile after the banning of a weapon before it checks to 
see whether such weapons are in common civilian use.”65  It also 
permits the government to automatically place new technologies 
outside of the reach of the Second Amendment through severely 
restrictive regulations or bans that eliminate the possibility for that 
technology to ever become “common.”66  Thus, the test makes the 
ability to possess novel firearm technology subject to the “good faith 
of the legislature”—despite the fact that the premise of the Second 
Amendment is to prevent free people from being wrongfully deprived 
of arms by the government.67 
Despite the problems it generates, the common use formula does 
establish a relatively narrow and well-defined class of protected 
firearms, excluding most military arms and large-scale deadly 
weapons.68  Further, because the Heller Court built upon Miller’s 
holding that gun possession must further the “lawful purpose” of self-
                                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at 367–68 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25).  The Heller majority 
offered the example of machine guns to support the alarming nature of the idea of 
including military organizations as “common users.” Heller I, 554 U.S. at 624.  
Protecting military equipment useful in warfare would mean that the Second 
Amendment protected machine guns, which would render unconstitutional the 
National Firearms Act’s prohibition on such fully automatic weapons (a provision not 
challenged in Miller). See id. 
 64. See Proposals to Reduce Gun Violence: Protecting Our Communities While 
Respecting the Second Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong. 13–14 (2013) (statement of Laurence Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Univ. Professor, 
Harvard Law Sch.); Lerner & Lund, supra note 55, at 1411; Darrell A.H. Miller, 
Analogies and Institutions in the First and Second Amendments: A Response to 
Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. 137, 142 n.28 (2013); O’Shea, supra note 23, at 
384-86. 
 65. Lerner & Lund, supra note 55, at 1411. 
 66. Id. 
 67. O’Shea, supra note 23, at 385. 
 68. Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the 
Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist 
Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1292 (2009).  The handgun, by contrast, is “the 
quintessential self-defense weapon . . . [and] the most popular weapon chosen by 
Americans for self-defense in the home.” Heller I, 554 U.S. 629. 
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defense, “[b]y definition, any device that would destroy both the self-
defender and the attacker in situations satisfying the imminent threat 
requirement [of self-defense is] outside the envelope.”69  While 
Justice Scalia conceded that a modern militia would necessarily 
require more sophisticated weapons than those from the eighteenth 
century, he adhered to the traditional notion that “the fact that 
modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the 
prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our 
interpretation of that right.”70  In any event, he concluded, the 
handgun’s popularity for American self-defense in the home rendered 
at least the District ban invalid.71 
Taken as a whole, the Heller decision establishes three critical 
propositions: first, that individuals have a constitutional right to 
protect themselves with usable firearms, and that this right is at its 
strongest in the home; second, that some burdens upon individual 
Second Amendment rights are presumptively lawful; and third, that 
the amendment does not protect dangerous or unusual weapons.72  
The first proposition has been termed “the Heller core” by scholars, 
and is widely accepted in both academia and lower courts.73  The 
second two have faced disparate interpretation, in part due to the 
Court’s failure to articulate a clear standard of review. 
II.  CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES POSED BY HIGH-CAPACITY 
MAGAZINE LEGISLATION 
A. Expanding Heller to the States: McDonald v. City of Chicago 
After Heller, courts were understandably confused.  The Supreme 
Court’s shift from Miller to Heller left judges mired in an adjusted 
view of the Second Amendment, and they struggled to find a 
workable way to apply the case to the increasing number of 
constitutional challenges to gun laws.  The Court attempted to clarify 
Heller in the subsequent case of McDonald v. City of Chicago by 
holding that the individual right to possess a handgun in the home for 
self-defense applied to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.74  The plaintiffs in McDonald challenged a Chicago 
                                                                                                                             
 69. Johnson, supra note 68, at 1292. 
 70. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 627–28. 
 71. See id. at 629. 
 72. See Kiehl, supra note 28, at 1143. 
 73. See id. 
 74. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
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statute prohibiting individuals from possessing a handgun in the city 
without a valid registration certificate.75  The same statute also 
prohibited the registration of nearly all handguns in city limits, which 
had the effect of banning handgun possession in Chicago.76  They 
additionally challenged an Oak Park, Illinois law making it “unlawful 
for any person to possess . . . any firearm.”77 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion held that because the Second 
Amendment is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” 
it is fundamental and must be incorporated to apply against the states 
under the Due Process Clause.78  Citing Heller, the McDonald 
majority confirmed that “individual self-defense is ‘the central 
component’ of the Second Amendment right . . . [and] ‘the need for 
defense of self, family, and property is most acute in the home.’”79  
The Court also adopted the Heller Court’s careful examination of the 
history and tradition of the Second Amendment, chronicling the 
original understanding of everyone from American colonists to the 
Framers and the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.80  At each 
step in his analysis, Justice Alito reiterated the view that the right to 
keep and bear arms is and always has been “among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”81  
Writing also for the plurality, Justice Alito further refused to treat the 
Second Amendment as a “second-class” right, distinct from other 
portions of the Bill of Rights deemed worthy of incorporation.82 
The McDonald Court, like the Heller Court, was careful to observe 
the state’s right to reasonably burden individual Second Amendment 
rights.83  For instance, Justice Alito specifically reaffirmed Justice 
Scalia’s non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful” gun regulations, 
                                                                                                                             
 75. Id. at 3026 (citing CHI., ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-20-050(a)–(c) (2009)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (quoting OAK PARK, ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 27-2-1 (2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Id. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
 79. Id. at 3036 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)). 
 80. See id. at 3037–42. 
 81. Id. at 3042. 
 82. Id. at 3044 (plurality opinion).  Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy 
comprised the plurality opinion.  Justice Thomas joined in the majority opinion, 
agreeing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the 
Second Amendment applicable to the states. Id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
But Thomas wrote separately to express his opinion that the Second Amendment 
should be incorporated through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 83. See id. at 3046. 
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stating that “[d]espite municipal respondents’ doomsday 
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating 
firearms.”84  However, he clearly articulated the suspect nature of 
blanket bans, like those instituted by Chicago and Oak Park.  While 
the municipal respondents noted that courts had upheld several state 
and local firearm laws, Justice Alito pointed out the “paucity of 
precedent sustaining bans comparable to those at issue here and in 
Heller.”85  Indeed, the municipal respondents in McDonald were able 
to locate only a single case from the late twentieth century upholding 
a ban similar to the one at issue.86 
McDonald served largely to affirm the core principles of Heller’s 
interpretation of the Second Amendment.87  The case also lent 
approval to the historical inquiry the Heller Court utilized.88  But 
Justice Alito failed to articulate a precise standard of review for 
modern firearm legislation, the constitutionality of which remains 
suspect after historical analysis.89  Despite this omission, Justice Alito 
stated clearly that the Court likely would not consider interest-
balancing to be the proper method of judicial review for gun 
legislation.90  Evaluating the municipal respondents’ contention that 
interest-balancing would be appropriate in this instance, Justice Alito 
asserted that “[i]n Heller . . . we expressly rejected the argument that 
the scope of the Second Amendment right should be determined by 
judicial interest balancing.”91  Justice Alito additionally eliminated the 
possibility of applying a “reasonableness” test, rejecting the municipal 
respondents’ argument that state and local governments should be 
able to “enact any gun control law they deem to be reasonable.”92  
Thus, after McDonald, both interest-balancing and reasonableness 
inquiries (like the rational basis test), are inappropriate when 
evaluating the contours of the right to keep and bear arms. 
                                                                                                                             
 84. Id. at 3047.  Justice Alito additionally cited Heller’s statement that the right 
extends to handguns because they are “overwhelmingly chosen by American society 
for [the] lawful purpose of self-defense,” implicitly supporting the common use test. 
Id. (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (pointing to municipal respondents’ citation of Kalodimos v. Morton 
Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984)). 
 87. See Kiehl, supra note 28, at 1139-40. 
 88. See id. at 1140. 
 89. See id. at 1141. 
 90. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion). 
 91. Id. (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 632–34 (2008)). 
 92. Id. at 3046 (citation omitted). 
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B. Evolution of the Common Use Test After McDonald 
The Supreme Court’s affirmation of the right to keep and bear 
arms spawned a wealth of decisions evaluating the Second 
Amendment in light of both the Heller core and its two articulated 
exceptions.  The first exception, Heller’s list of “presumptively 
lawful” statutes, has provided something of a guidepost for courts to 
follow when making constitutional determinations about gun laws, 
even if placing a given statute into the “presumptively lawful” 
category occasionally takes some judicial wrangling.93  The second 
exception—the common use test—is somewhat murkier to apply.  
Nevertheless, the common use test is arguably more faithful to the 
historical inquiry presented by the Heller Court, prompting a more 
thorough review of the challenged statute and its purpose. 
When choosing how to apply the common use test, courts must 
determine whether the test reaches the challenged statute.94  Thus, 
judges are generally required to place gun laws into one of two 
categories to determine whether the common use test applies.  The 
first are “prohibition statutes,” or legislation that either bans or 
constructively bans firearms themselves or an item critical to their 
use.95  These laws fall well within the scope of the common use test 
because they necessarily implicate an evaluation of whether the 
banned firearm or equipment was in “common use” at the time the 
Second Amendment was established.96  If so (assuming the statute is 
not “presumptively lawful”), a ban would be unconstitutional.  When 
evaluated under the common use test, these cases are often the “easy 
fits,” and a straightforward answer often emerges; blanket bans are 
almost always impermissible.97  The most obviously problematic 
prohibition statutes concern bans of commonly owned firearms, like 
the laws struck down in Heller and McDonald.98  Other forms of 
prohibition statutes could possibly be construed to include laws 
requiring loaded chamber indicators, integral trigger locks, or other 
mechanisms that severely diminish or eliminate the utility of the 
                                                                                                                             
 93. Professor Darrell A.H. Miller has criticized what he considers to be the 
“mechanical” application of Heller’s “presumptively lawful” categories in an attempt 
to fit a challenged statute within one of them; this, he argues, undercuts the exacting 
and individualized historical inquiry demanded by the Heller Court. Miller, supra 
note 39, at 855. 
 94. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1273. 
 95. See id. at 1264. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id.  Commonly owned firearms include handguns and popular long guns, 
the types of weapons that have been in existence in some form since the Framing. Id. 
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firearm for self-defense.99  But the common use test is far from a 
death knell to all laws banning guns or related equipment.  For 
instance, the test would uphold statutes prohibiting fully automatic 
repeaters (true machine guns) because they have traditionally been 
rare for civilian use and heavily restricted.100 
The second category of restrictions that courts must consider under 
Heller’s common use test are “limiting statutes,” which simply add 
“regulatory friction” to legally keeping and bearing firearms.101  
Examples include waiting periods, taxes and processing fees, and laws 
like concealed carry restrictions that regulate possession outside of 
the home.102  This type of legislation is often beyond the reach of the 
common use test, because it does not directly prohibit a commonly 
owned firearm.103  But limiting statutes necessarily fall along a sliding 
scale, and some may present so much “friction” that they become 
constitutionally problematic.  For instance, legislation that effectively 
eliminates the right to own a gun by employing an escalating series of 
requirements, waiting periods, and taxes could so severely infringe on 
the individual right to keep and bear arms in the aggregate as to be 
unconstitutional, though courts have indicated that such limitations 
may be tolerable as long as the core Second Amendment right is 
respected.104  Limiting statutes create the most complicated issues for 
courts applying the standard articulated by the Heller and McDonald 
Courts. 
C. Popular Option: The Marzzarella Two-Step 
Heller and McDonald prompted a veritable flood of Second 
Amendment challenges.105  Left without a clearly articulated standard 
of review to apply when deciding such issues, lower courts were 
largely left to their own devices to fashion one.  As a result, courts 
faced with gun laws have employed everything from the rational basis 
test106 to strict scrutiny107 in an attempt to determine an appropriate 
                                                                                                                             
 99. See id. at 1264–65. 
 100. Johnson, supra note 68, at 1293. 
 101. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1274. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1273. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Stacey L. Sobel, A Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do 
Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 511 (2012). 
 106. See, e.g., Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo, No. 2:09-CV-01235 MCE-DAD, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 51906, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (utilizing the rational basis test to 
deny plaintiff’s request for a concealed carry permit because the law at issue did not 
“substantially burden” his Second Amendment rights).  It is worth noting that Justice 
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method of analysis.  Some, like the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, have held that Heller and McDonald mandate the 
application of “heightened scrutiny” to such legislation.108  Under 
“heightened scrutiny,” the Seventh Circuit stated that the government 
must establish a “strong public-interest justification” for the law in 
question to be upheld.109  The government’s burden under this test is 
not one traditionally associated with any established type of review.110  
Such varied experimentation exemplifies lower courts’ deep 
confusion when faced with Second Amendment challenges. 
Many courts considering the issue have settled upon a self-designed 
two-step inquiry when faced with legislation potentially impinging on 
the right to keep and bear arms.  This test was first laid out by the 
Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella.111  In Marzzarella, the 
defendant was indicted for possession of a handgun with a partially 
obliterated serial number in violation of federal law.112  The court 
employed a dual-pronged test, which required it to first determine 
“whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee;” if not, the 
court’s inquiry would conclude.113  If so, the Third Circuit held, an 
evaluating court should “evaluate the law under some form of means-
end scrutiny.  If the law passes muster under that standard, it is 
constitutional.  If it fails, it is invalid.”114  The most appropriate form 
of means-end scrutiny (for both the Third Circuit and the majority of 
courts utilizing this test) is most often an intermediate standard of 
                                                                                                                             
Scalia explicitly prohibited the use of the rational basis test for Second Amendment 
cases. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
 107. United States v. Ligon, No. 3:04-CR-00185-HDM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
116272, at *16–17 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2010).  Some scholars have advocated for Justice 
Breyer’s view that it is doctrinally impossible to use strict scrutiny for the Second 
Amendment while still honoring Heller’s “presumptively lawful” exception. See 
Sobel, supra note 105, at 512 (citing Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search 
of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
1371, 1379 (2009)). 
 108. 651 F.3d 684, 706 (7th Cir. 2011).  In Ezell, the Seventh Circuit struck down a 
Chicago law requiring range training as a prerequisite to lawful gun ownership, while 
simultaneously banning within city limits any range at which such training could take 
place. Id. at 689–90. 
 109. Id. at 708–09.  The court classified “heightened scrutiny” as more rigorous, 
though not quite “strict scrutiny.” Id. at 708.  The range ban, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded, fell far short of meeting this standard. Id. at 709. 
 110. Sobel, supra note 105, at 513. 
 111. 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 112. Id. at 87. 
 113. Id. at 89. 
 114. Id. 
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review, and the regulation must be “substantially related” to an 
“important governmental interest” to be valid.115  Thus, the two-step 
test established in Marzzarella and subsequently followed by several 
circuits116 combines both a historical and an interest-balancing inquiry. 
Courts employing this analysis are often required to determine 
whether the common use test applies during the first step of the 
Marzzarella test, where they must decide whether an individual’s 
Second Amendment rights have been impermissibly burdened.  In 
doing so, this Note suggests that courts must at least implicitly 
characterize the challenged statute as prohibiting or limiting.117  A 
prohibiting statute will not survive application of the common use test 
if the gun or equipment prohibited is popularly and historically 
used.118  In contrast, a limiting statute will often fall beyond the reach 
of the common use test,119 and thus stand a far better chance of 
moving on to the second step of the Marzzarella method of analysis.  
For instance, in Marzzarella, the Third Circuit cast the law banning 
handguns without serial numbers as a type of prohibiting statute, but 
held that it would not be protected under the common use test: 
[S]erial numbers on firearms did not exist at the time of 
ratification . . . . It would make little sense to categorically protect a 
class of weapons bearing a certain characteristic when, at the time of 
ratification, citizens had no concept of that characteristic or how it 
fit  within the right to bear arms.120 
Thus, because the regulation did not seem to impermissibly burden 
the defendant’s Second Amendment rights, the Third Circuit halted 
its analysis at step one.121  Consequently, the way courts embracing 
this test categorize challenged legislation plays a major role in 
whether the law is subjected to some form of judicial interest-
balancing. 
Several Circuits, including the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth 
and Tenth, have followed the Third Circuit’s lead in employing the 
                                                                                                                             
 115. See Sobel, supra note 105, at 514. 
 116. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle 
Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 
195 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 799–801 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 117. Cf. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1264. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1273–74. 
 120. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 121. Id. at 95.  The court proceeded to analyze and uphold the law under 
intermediate scrutiny, however, in order to fully foreclose the defendant’s argument. 
Id. at 95–101. 
2014] SECOND AMENDMENT REVIEW 1059 
Marzzarella test.122  While some Circuits place more emphasis on the 
history of the Second Amendment than others, each employs some 
form of the two-step test articulated in Marzzarella.123  Thus, each 
Circuit using the test enjoys some ability to customize its application 
while adhering to the same framework.  This local laterality, along 
with a pattern of nationwide use since the test’s inception, could 
explain the widespread acceptance of this approach among circuit 
courts. 
D. Reframing the Question: Judge Kavanaugh Dissents 
Despite the Marzzarella two-step test’s burgeoning popularity, 
alarmingly few courts have explained how the second part of the test 
comports with Heller and McDonald’s rejection of interest-balancing 
inquiries.124  Courts utilizing this test seem unwilling to acknowledge 
the Supreme Court’s clear warning against the use of idiosyncratic 
judicial evaluations of the right to keep and bear arms.125  
Additionally, the indeterminacy of the “consensus candidate” of 
evaluation—intermediate scrutiny—leaves the door open for just this 
type of idiosyncratic analysis in an area rife with political controversy 
and emotional tension.126  In 2011, Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. 
Circuit chose to lead the charge against the use of an interest-
balancing analysis for the Second Amendment in Heller II.127  In 
doing so, he opened the door to a different method of analysis for 
lower courts considering the issue. 
Heller II concerned the District’s renewed attempts to limit local 
possession of firearms.  Post-Heller, the District enacted the Firearms 
Registration Amendment Act of 2008 (FRA), which (1) required a 
strict firearms registration procedure and (2) prohibited both the 
registration of “assault weapons” and the possession of magazines 
                                                                                                                             
 122. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 864, 874 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 
F.3d 81, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2012); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco 
Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 799–801 (10th 
Cir. 2010). 
 123. Cf. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876–77 (describing only recent threats posed by guns 
in Baltimore to justify limitations on concealed carry); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91 
(examining the deep historical roots behind a New York law requiring “good and 
proper cause” to obtain a concealed carry permit). 
 124. Miller supra note 39, at 870–71. 
 125. Id. (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3045–56 (2010)). 
 126. Id. at 871. 
 127. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269–96 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
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with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition.128  The 
registration provision was extensive, requiring, among several other 
things, a demonstration of knowledge of the District’s laws and 
submitting each pistol to be registered “for a ballistics identification 
procedure.”129  The definition of “assault weapons” as employed by 
the District included certain brands and models of semi-automatic 
rifles, pistols, and shotguns (including the Colt AR-15 series of rifles), 
as well as semi-automatic firearms with certain features regardless of 
make and model, such as thumbhole stocks.130  The Heller II plaintiffs 
were each denied applications to register firearms based upon 
restrictions in the FRA.  Dick Heller himself was denied registration 
of both a semi-automatic rifle and a pistol containing a fifteen-round 
magazine.131 
Judge Douglas Ginsburg, writing for the D.C. Circuit majority, 
utilized the two-step approach articulated in Marzzarella to analyze 
the registration requirements as to handguns.132  Ginsburg divided the 
requirements into two categories: “basic” and “novel.”133  He 
concluded that the basic registration requirement, as applied to 
handguns but not to long guns, fell into the “presumptively lawful” 
exception articulated in Heller, and thus only reached the first step of 
the Marzzarella analysis.134  Because the basic requirement to register 
handguns is “longstanding” and “deeply enough rooted in our 
history,” he determined that such a mandate “does not impinge upon 
the right protected by the Second Amendment.”135  The majority 
asserted that the plaintiffs had failed to rebut the presumptively 
lawful nature of the basic registration because they did not show that 
the regulation had more than a de minimis effect on their rights.136  In 
contrast, Judge Ginsburg subjected the novel registration 
requirements to the second step of the Marzzarella analysis.137  
Utilizing intermediate scrutiny, the D.C. Circuit remanded these 
                                                                                                                             
 128. Id. at 1247. 
 129. Id. at 1248–49. 
 130. Id. at 1249. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1252–53. 
 133. Id. at 1253, 1255.  The “basic” registration requirement included only the 
general requirement to register handguns. “Novel” registration requirements 
included modern registration restrictions utilized by the District, such as the 
ballistics-identification provision. 
 134. Id. at 1253–54. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1253. 
 137. Id. at 1255. 
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requirements to the district court for further evidentiary proceedings 
to give the District an opportunity to “adequately show a substantial 
relationship between any of the novel registration requirements and 
an important government interest.”138 
The Heller II majority then separately addressed the question of 
the “assault weapon” and high-capacity magazine ban.139  Applying 
the common use test, Judge Ginsburg could not conclusively 
determine whether either was entitled to any Second Amendment 
protection.140  The court found it clear from the record that both semi-
automatic rifles and magazines with a capacity exceeding ten rounds 
are in common use among private citizens.141  Nevertheless, the court 
could not hold with certainty whether they “are commonly used or 
are useful specifically for self-defense or hunting,” and declined to 
determine whether the regulation impinged upon the right to keep 
and bear arms.142  Because he was reasonably certain that the 
prohibitions on both did not substantially burden the plaintiffs’ 
Second Amendment rights, Judge Ginsburg found it unnecessary to 
resolve this question, and thus subjected them to intermediate 
scrutiny.143  The court held that the District’s stated interest 
supporting the regulation of protecting police officers and controlling 
crime was important, and that the prohibition was substantially 
related to this interest because assault weapons and high-capacity 
magazines are favored by criminals and place law enforcement 
                                                                                                                             
 138. Id. at 1259–60.  The court pointed to the parties’ failure to distinguish between 
handguns and long guns in their briefs as an example of a sufficient deficiency in the 
record. Id. at 1259. 
 139. Id. at 1260. 
 140. Id. at 1261. 
 141. Id. (reciting statistics from the record revealing that the AR-15 accounted for 
14.4% of all rifles produced in the United States for domestic market in 2007.  As to 
large-capacity magazines, the court cited statistics showing that in 1994, 18% of all 
firearms owned by civilians were equipped with magazines holding more than ten 
rounds, as well as statistics demonstrating that 4.7 million more such magazines were 
imported in the United States between 1995 and 2000). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1261–62.  Unlike the ban in Heller I, Judge Ginsburg held, the laws at 
issue in Heller II did not “prohibit the possession of the quintessential self-defense 
weapon, to wit, the handgun.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Notably, the 
Heller II majority did not directly address the frequency with which handguns in the 
District contained magazines exceeding ten rounds, and consequently did not 
consider whether the challenged statute substantially affected handgun possession 
with respect to high-capacity magazines.  Furthermore, the Heller II court concluded 
that because other guns are available for self-defense besides semi-automatic rifles or 
firearms with large-capacity magazines, “the prohibition . . . does not effectively 
disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend themselves.” Id. at 
1262. 
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officials at heightened risk due to their increased firepower.144  Judge 
Ginsburg acknowledged Heller’s rejection of interest-balancing tests, 
but concluded that heightened scrutiny was not the type of balancing 
the Supreme Court had rejected.145 
Judge Kavanaugh disagreed with both the majority’s conclusions 
and its two-step analysis in dissent, and proposed an entirely new 
test.146  According to Judge Kavanaugh, the form of evaluation 
developed from Marzzarella is based upon a complete misreading of 
the Heller core, which explicitly prohibited the use of balancing tests 
like strict or intermediate scrutiny.147  Rather, Heller mandated the 
examination of “text, history, and tradition” to both determine the 
scope of Second Amendment rights and assess gun legislation.148  
Under Judge Kavanaugh’s reading, Heller set forth “precise 
guidance” for courts faced with challenges to gun legislation, which 
may fall into one of two categories: bans on categories of guns, or 
regulations on the sale, possession, or use of guns.149  He focused upon 
the common use test for the first category, explaining that legislatures 
may ban classes of guns “that have been banned in our ‘historical 
tradition’ – namely, guns that are ‘dangerous and unusual’ and thus 
are not ‘the sorts of lawful weapons that’ citizens typically ‘possess[] 
at home.’”150  Judge Kavanaugh further employed the “presumptively 
lawful” exception for the second category, where he opined that the 
government “may continue to impose regulations that are traditional, 
‘longstanding’ regulations in the United States.”151 
Turning to the majority’s analysis, Judge Kavanaugh severely 
criticized Judge Ginsburg’s interpretation of Heller’s restriction on 
interest-balancing: “The premise of the majority opinion’s more 
                                                                                                                             
 144. Id. at 1263–64.  Judge Ginsburg also suggested that semi-automatic rifles 
could fall under Heller’s “dangerous and unusual” exception, because the Heller 
Court suggested that military M-16 rifles may be in this category and “it is difficult to 
draw meaningful distinctions between the AR-15 and the M-16.” Id. at 1263 (citations 
omitted). 
 145. Id. at 1265.  The type of interest-balancing the Heller Court rejected, Judge 
Ginsburg stated, was a more nebulous “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing 
inquiry’ that would have a court weigh the asserted governmental interests against 
the burden the Government would place upon exercise of the Second Amendment 
right, a balancing test that is not part of strict or intermediate scrutiny.” Id. 
 146. Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1271–72 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 627 
(2008)). 
 151. Id. at 1272 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626–27). 
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general point – that Heller’s rejection of balancing tests does not 
mean it rejected strict and intermediate scrutiny – is incorrect.  Strict 
and intermediate scrutiny are balancing tests and thus are necessarily 
encompassed by Heller’s more general rejection of balancing.”152  He 
traced the evolution of heightened scrutiny through its inception in 
First Amendment jurisprudence, noting, 
[S]trict and intermediate scrutiny come in a variety of flavors and 
are not always applied in the exact same way in all settings . . . . But 
they always involve at least some assessment of whether the law in 
question is sufficiently important to justify infringement on an 
individual constitutional right. That’s balancing.153 
While strict and intermediate scrutiny are appropriate and 
traditionally utilized in particular scenarios, like substantive due 
process and First Amendment cases, Judge Kavanaugh cited several 
areas where such analysis is not invoked to show that heightened 
scrutiny is not a one-size-fits-all inquiry.154  He further pointed to the 
Heller majority’s express rejection of the intermediate scrutiny 
analysis proposed in Justice Breyer’s dissent in that case.155  Judge 
Kavanaugh additionally reminded the majority that “in Heller, the 
Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s decision, which similarly 
declined to adopt a strict or intermediate scrutiny test.”156  In sum, it 
“would hardly have been unusual or unthinkable for the Supreme 
Court to set forth a Second Amendment test based on text, history 
and tradition – rather than a heightened scrutiny approach.”157 
Applying the “text, history, and tradition” formulation, Judge 
Kavanaugh concluded that both restrictions imposed by the District 
were unconstitutional.158  As to the registration requirements, he 
argued that they failed to fall into the “presumptively lawful” 
category because restrictions of the type utilized by the District are 
not “longstanding.”159  The majority’s conclusion that basic 
registration has deep historical roots, he contended, was based upon a 
                                                                                                                             
 152. Id. at 1280 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 1282 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 1283 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  Kavanaugh pointed specifically to the 
Jury Trial Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, the 
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 155. Id. at 1278 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 1283–84 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 1283 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. at 1285 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. at 1291 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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flawed reading.160  Though he conceded that colonial militia members 
were required to register some of their weapons, Kavanaugh pointed 
out that such laws did not apply to all citizens and required 
militiamen to submit only one, rather than all of, their firearms for 
inspection.161  As such, he found the District’s registration 
requirement unconstitutional because it “is not part of the tradition of 
gun regulation in the United States; it is the most stringent such law in 
the Nation; and it is significantly more onerous than traditional 
licensing requirements or record-keeping requirements imposed only 
on gun sellers.”162  Because the District’s registration requirements 
were not “longstanding” and thus not presumptively lawful, 
Kavanaugh had little trouble dismissing them as unconstitutional. 
Judge Kavanaugh reached a similar conclusion evaluating the 
constitutionality of the District’s “assault weapons” ban.163  He 
characterized the ban on semi-automatic rifles as identical to the 
clearly unconstitutional handgun ban struck down in Heller.164  
Acknowledging the District’s concern about the use of semi-
automatic rifles in crime, Judge Kavanaugh then pointed to an 
underlying logical flaw: 
In support of its law, [the District] suggests that semi-automatic 
rifles are ‘offensive’ and not just ‘defensive.’  But that is plainly true 
of semi-automatic handguns as well . . . and yet the Supreme Court 
held semi-automatic handguns to be constitutionally protected.  
Moreover, it’s hard to see why, if a gun is effective for ‘offense,’ it 
might not also be effective for ‘defense.’ . . . There is no reason to 
think that semi-automatic rifles are not effective for self-defense in 
the home, which Heller explained is the core purpose of the Second 
Amendment right.165 
Kavanaugh was also dismissive of the majority’s claim that 
individuals could own other types of weapons for self-defense, and 
thus were not entitled to semi-automatic rifles.  “In Heller,” he 
contended, “[the District] argued that it could ban handguns because 
individuals could still own rifles. That argument failed.”166  He found 
no difference between the present scenario and said failed argument: 
“Here, [the District] contends that it can ban rifles because 
                                                                                                                             
 160. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at 1293 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 1294 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 1290 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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individuals can still own handguns.  [The District’s] at-least-you-can-
still-possess-other-kinds-of-guns argument is no more persuasive this 
time around.”167  Because the majority could not “persuasively 
explain why semi-automatic handguns are constitutionally protected 
but semi-automatic rifles are not,” Kavanaugh found the “assault 
weapons” legislation no more valid than the District’s handgun ban in 
Heller.168 
Judge Kavanaugh further proposed an answer to some of the 
questions raised in the wake of Heller regarding new technology and 
the common use test.169  He concluded that the constitutionality of 
novel technology was still easily resolved under the “text, history, and 
tradition” test, even though “there obviously will not be a history or 
tradition of banning such weapons or imposing such regulations.”170  
The appropriate analysis in such situations under Judge Kavanaugh’s 
approach would be to “reason by analogy from history and tradition,” 
as courts have done in the face of emerging technology in First and 
Fourth Amendment cases.171  This approach takes some indirect steps 
towards resolving the question of who the common user should be, 
because it allows courts to identify common users of particular 
weapons (like military firearms) in the past.  Troublingly, this analysis 
does little to resolve the circularity problem for advanced 
technologies that may have no historical analogue.  Indeed, Judge 
Kavanaugh himself admitted that “applying constitutional principles 
to novel modern conditions can be difficult and leave close questions 
at the margins.”172  But, he argued, “that is hardly unique to the 
Second Amendment.  It is an essential component of judicial 
decisionmaking [sic] under our enduring Constitution.”173 
E. Recent Judicial Approval of the Kavanaugh Approach 
Though of recent vintage, Judge Kavanaugh’s method of 
interpretation of Second Amendment rights using text, history, and 
tradition has garnered explicit judicial support in at least one instance 
since Heller II’s decision.  In Gowder v. City of Chicago, the 
Northern District of Illinois considered the constitutionality of an 
ordinance prohibiting the approval of a firearm permit for an 
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 169. Id. at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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applicant convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm.174  The 
plaintiff, Shawn Gowder, was convicted in 1995 of felony unlawful use 
of a weapon under Illinois’ Safe Neighborhood Act.175  In 1999, the 
Illinois Supreme Court found the Safe Neighborhood Act 
unconstitutional, and Gowder’s conviction was reduced to a non-
violent misdemeanor.176  At the time, the City of Chicago required 
persons living within the city to obtain a permit in order to possess a 
weapon in their homes.177 Chicago residents could not obtain the 
requisite permit if they had been convicted of unlawful use a firearm, 
even if the offense was a non-violent misdemeanor.178  Gowder 
applied for a permit, which the City of Chicago denied because of his 
previous misdemeanor charge.179  He subsequently challenged the 
denial and the constitutionality of the statute.180 
Reviewing Gowder’s motion for summary judgment, Judge Der-
Yeghiayan employed Kavanaugh’s “text, history, and tradition” 
method of analysis.181 He hinged his discussion upon the 
“presumptively lawful” exception to Second Amendment protection 
articulated in Heller, which approved of longstanding and traditional 
laws barring felons from firearm possession.182  Judge Der-Yeghiayan 
concluded that statutes prohibiting all criminals from gun 
possession—without differentiating between felons and 
misdemeanants, or violent or nonviolent criminals—did “not find a 
valid foothold in statutory history,” and thus could not find safe 
harbor as presumptively lawful.183  The Chicago statute, he described, 
impermissibly 
lumps together non-violent misdemeanants, violent misdemeanants, 
and felons. While the Supreme Court has historically allowed 
prohibitions to certain individuals, including felons and those 
convicted of violent crimes, at the time the Second Amendment was 
passed . . . it was not intended to apply to non-violent 
misdemeanants, nor has this group of individuals traditionally been 
barred from exercising their inherent Second Amendment rights.184 
                                                                                                                             
 174. 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1113–14. 
 179. Id. at 1113. 
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 181. Id. at 1119. 
 182. Id. at 1121 (citing United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
 183. Id. at 1122. 
 184. Id. 
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Judge Der-Yeghiayan also found it problematic that the Chicago 
statute regulated firearm possession in the home by non-violent 
misdemeanants, clearly infringing upon the Heller core.185  Further, he 
concluded that even if the Kavanaugh approach was inappropriate 
and an interest-balancing approach had to be applied, the proper 
standard would be strict scrutiny, and the Chicago regulation would 
fail.186 
F. The Puzzle of High-Capacity Magazine Restrictions 
High-capacity magazines have emerged as a new frontier for 
government regulation of firearms and pose unique analytical 
questions.  Unlike guns themselves, magazines do not pose a threat 
standing alone, nor do they bear any relation to an individual’s ability 
to carry or initially obtain a gun.  But the potentially lethal 
combination of guns and high-capacity magazines have left these 
items subject to increasing legislation.187  As such, high-capacity 
magazines provide a particularly useful vehicle for finding the proper 
method of analysis for Second Amendment rights.  The question and 
utility of magazine size limitation has come into sharp focus in the 
wake of mass shootings like those in Aurora and Sandy Hook.188  
Several states, such as Connecticut189 and New York190 have rushed to 
pass laws severely curtailing the legal size of magazines, leaving the 
                                                                                                                             
 185. Id. at 1122–23.  Judge Der-Yeghiayan opined that: 
This is a case where a person is required by the City of Chicago to apply for 
a Chicago Firearm Permit in order to legally possess a firearm at home for 
self-defense, which is a core Second Amendment constitutional 
right . . . . The same Constitution that protects the people’s right to keep and 
bear arms prohibits this type of indiscriminate and arbitrary government 
regulation . . . any attempt to dilute or restrict a core constitutional right 
with justifications that do not have a basis in history and tradition is 
inherently suspect. 
Id. 
 186. Id. at 1123. 
 187. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-301 (West 2013); 2013 CONN. ACTS 
13-3 (Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE § 7-2506.01 (2013); 2013 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2230 
(McKinney). 
 188. Complete Coverage on Theater Shooting in Aurora, CNN, 
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interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (linking to 
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 189. 2013 CONN. ACTS 13-3 (Reg. Sess.). 
 190. 2013 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2230 (McKinney). 
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term “high-capacity magazine” itself without a cognizable national 
definition.  Some states limit magazine sizes to seven rounds of 
ammunition, though the general consensus among states restricting 
magazine size hovers near ten rounds.191 
While mass shootings of the sort seen recently are truly horrific 
incidents to be warded against, it is not clear that magazines over the 
common ten-round limit would be materially more dangerous than 
magazines of a smaller size.192  Although a gun with a larger magazine 
is theoretically more lethal than one with a smaller magazine, the 
overwhelming majority of gun crime involves far fewer shots than ten, 
or even seven.193  The fear that larger magazines will enable more 
mass shootings may be a similarly misplaced concern.  Indeed, 
“[g]iven that removing a magazine and inserting a new one takes only 
a few seconds, a mass murderer—especially one armed with a backup 
gun—would hardly be stymied by the magazine size limit.”194  Further, 
in the extremely rare instance where an individual would need more 
than ten rounds for self-defense, magazine size limitations require the 
defender to engage in the additional time and preparation of having a 
spare magazine available and reloading his or her gun.195  Though 
such hypotheticals are certainly grim, it is clear after Heller and 
McDonald that limitations on individual Second Amendment rights 
are to be seriously evaluated under all circumstances. 
Because Heller is silent as to high-capacity magazine bans, courts 
are left to independently evaluate the bans’ constitutionality.  First, 
courts must determine whether high-capacity magazines readily fall 
into one of the two exceptions articulated in Heller.  Bans on high-
capacity magazines are neither longstanding nor deeply rooted in 
history.196  Additionally, the “presumptively lawful” exception does 
not appear to cover high-capacity magazines, as they do not fall in 
one of the example categories articulated by Justice Scalia.197  
                                                                                                                             
 191. CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: LAWS ON HIGH CAPACITY 
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 192. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for 
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“High-Capacity” Magazines?, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (2013), 
http://www.nssf.org/factsheets/PDF/HighCapMag.pdf. 
 194. Volokh, supra note 192, at 1489. 
 195. See supra text accompanying note 191. 
 196. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
 197. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
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However, whether high-capacity magazine bans may be valid under 
the common use test requires more in-depth analysis. 
To determine whether a given weapon is valid under the common 
use test, scholars have proposed that it must meet two separate 
requirements: quantity and legitimacy.198  The “quantity” requirement 
means that the weapon must be either “numerically common” (widely 
owned) or “functionally common” (functionally identical to other 
common guns).199  The “legitimacy” requirement means that the 
weapon must be possessed for lawful purposes, like self-defense.200  
High-capacity magazines (defined tentatively as magazines capable of 
holding more than ten rounds of ammunition) are certainly 
numerically common; by some estimates, more than thirty million 
detachable magazines in circulation in the United States can 
accommodate more than thirty rounds.201  Because high-capacity 
magazines operate the way traditional magazines have in semi-
automatic weapons for over a century, they are also functionally 
common.202  Additionally, high-capacity magazines serve an identical 
purpose to their smaller counterparts: supplying ammunition to a 
functional firearm.  Thus, they are ideally suited in any capacity to a 
lawful purpose like self-defense.  As such, although they are not 
“arms” in the traditional sense, high-capacity magazines are, by 
analogy, well within the scope of Second Amendment protection 
according to Heller.203 
Although high-capacity magazines satisfy the broad requirements 
of the common use test, to receive the protection offered by Heller 
they must be neither “dangerous” nor “unusual.”204  This requirement 
poses a far more complicated issue, and one highly influenced by 
social attitudes and the “cringe factor” surrounding the use of items 
intended to provide a relatively large quantity of ammunition to a 
semi-automatic weapon.205  While high-capacity magazines are 
                                                                                                                             
 198. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 1292–93; Dan Terzian, The Right to Bear 
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1070 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
certainly not “unusual,” there is debate over whether they may 
qualify as “dangerous,” with advocates on both sides of the issue.  
Those arguing that high-capacity magazines are dangerous and 
worthy of exclusion from Second Amendment protection state that 
they are “disproportionately involved in the murder of law 
enforcement officers and in mass shootings, and have little value for 
self-defense or sport.”206  Further, they contend, magazines above a 
ten-round capacity are more harmful in self-defense situations due to 
“the tendency . . . for defenders to keep firing until all bullets have 
been expended, which poses grave risks to others in the household, 
passersby, and bystanders.”207  Those who oppose these types of bans 
point to the utility of high-capacity magazines in protection 
scenarios.208  Without high-capacity magazines, they argue, persons in 
a stressful self-defense situation would have to pause in order to 
reload the firearm.209  Moreover, responsible ownership of high-
capacity magazines, they contend, presents no more of a threat than 
ownership of magazines below a smaller mandated number.210  
Additionally, proponents of a “non-dangerous” categorization point 
to a reduction in violent crime following the expiration of the Federal 
Assault Weapons Ban in 2004, which banned magazines capable of 
holding over ten rounds.211 
The question of new technology and the circularity problem also 
plague the question of high-capacity magazine restrictions’ 
constitutionality.  Consider a hypothetical scenario in which 
technological development in after-market magazines for semi-
automatic rifles and handguns has created a magazine exceeding ten 
rounds that is twenty percent less likely to jam when fired rapidly.212  
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2014] SECOND AMENDMENT REVIEW 1071 
This advancement creates an admittedly more lethal weapon, but also 
one that is both more reliable in an extreme self-defense scenario and 
more useful for endeavors like hunting or sport.  Laws banning 
magazines with this advancement would prevent a more predictable 
and sophisticated product from becoming a weapon in “common 
use,” denying it Second Amendment protection under Heller.  If 
courts do not label high-capacity magazines “dangerous” within the 
meaning of the Heller exception, laws banning the advanced 
magazines would impinge on the individual rights to keep and bear 
arms for self-defense.  Consequently, courts would have to engage in 
an extensive case-by-case inquiry to evaluate the constitutionality of 
all legislation addressing all future magazine developments. 
Conversely, if courts deem high-capacity magazines “dangerous,” 
banning the advanced magazines presents no constitutional problems 
under Heller, and laws banning such products could freely stand.  
Under this model, any technological advancements in magazine 
technology conceivably could never enjoy Second Amendment 
protection.  As this example illustrates, high-capacity magazine 
restrictions present a unique and complicated constitutional problem, 
and one that has yet to be thoroughly analyzed by lower courts after 
Heller, McDonald, and Heller II. 
III.  TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION, NOT A TWO-STEP TEST 
Since 2008, judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment has 
clearly undergone major change.  Because the Supreme Court failed 
to articulate a clear standard of review for the individual right to keep 
and bear arms, courts have necessarily struggled to settle on a single 
method.  As discussed in Part I, two primary analytical routes have 
emerged: the two-step test articulated in Marzzarella, and the “text, 
history, and tradition” test established in Judge Kavanaugh’s Heller II 
dissent and approved of in Gowder.  This Note proposes that the 
Kavanaugh approach offers several advantages over the Marzzarella 
test, including increased judicial flexibility, predictability of result, 
ease of use, and adherence to established Supreme Court precedent.  
This Note then illustrates the benefits of the Kavanaugh approach 
over the Marzzarella two-step by applying both tests to high-capacity 
magazine restrictions, and determines that the Kavanaugh approach 
most readily provides a solution to the complications posed by such 
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legislation.  Finally, this Note acknowledges the flaws inherent in the 
Kavanaugh approach, raising questions for future research. 
A. The Kavanaugh Approach Permits Increased Judicial 
Flexibility 
The first benefit the Kavanaugh test provides over an interest-
balancing analysis is increased judicial flexibility.213  Under both 
intermediate and strict scrutiny, courts are bound to a set inquiry 
developed with an eye to constitutional provisions that have 
developed along far different jurisprudential lines than the Second 
Amendment.  Conversely, under the Kavanaugh approach, judges are 
permitted to analyze the historical application and traditional roots of 
the precise legislation the state seeks to impose.214  Contrary to the 
Heller II majority’s argument that a text, history, and tradition 
approach would place too many gun laws in jeopardy, this approach 
actually permits courts to uphold more restrictions than they would 
under an interest-balancing test; the only restriction is that the 
challenged legislation finds some footing in American history.215  This 
type of flexibility removes concern about judges legislating from the 
bench, because a case-by-case incorporation of traditional gun 
restrictions allows the judiciary to remove personal politics from the 
equation and simply focus upon long-standing evidence.  As a result, 
the Kavanaugh approach gives judges a greater range of 
consideration than an interest-balancing approach, which would 
require them to categorize and compare state interests that are often 
nebulous and difficult to define. 
B. The Kavanaugh Approach Creates More Predictable Results 
While the Kavanaugh approach offers more flexibility, its emphasis 
on history and tradition yields far more predictable results than 
interest-balancing analysis.  State legislatures will have a far better 
understanding of what types of restrictions are constitutionally 
permissible under a standard approach focusing on a well-established 
body of evidence.  Further, observing text, history, and tradition does 
not require litigants to engage in predictive judicial mind reading 
when presenting a challenge to a particular restriction.  While the 
three factors the Kavanaugh approach relies upon can be difficult to 
define in some circumstances, they are certainly easier to analyze than 
                                                                                                                             
 213. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 214. See id. at 1272 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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the relative utility of a stated government interest.  While under the 
Marzzarella approach judges only need to engage in interest-
balancing if they determine that the challenged legislation infringes 
on a core Second Amendment right, such analysis requires some level 
of subjective judicial characterization at both junctures.216  The 
Kavanaugh approach thus offers more predictable results as it goes 
further towards removing personal judicial predilection from the 
analysis of a particular Second Amendment case. 
C. The Kavanaugh Approach Offers Significant Ease of Use 
In the same vein, the Kavanaugh approach offers the additional 
benefit of judicial ease of use.  While certainly not all judges prefer to 
engage in extensive textual or historical analysis, Kavanaugh’s test 
provides a simple formula for those that do.  Rather than apply a two-
prong test, courts could simply compare the historical background of 
the challenged regulation and the text of the Second Amendment.  
This approach thus avoids the problem of having to articulate an 
appropriate standard of review, which the Supreme Court declined to 
set in Heller and McDonald.217  As Judge Kavanaugh explained, 
In sum, our task as a lower court here is narrow and constrained by 
precedent.  We need not squint to divine some hidden meaning from 
Heller about what tests to apply.  Heller was up-front about the role 
of text, history, and tradition in Second Amendment analysis—and 
about the absence of a role for judicial interest balancing or 
assessment of costs and benefits of gun regulations.218 
As such, this test allows reviewing courts to execute the “narrow 
task” presented to them, and avoid creating or adhering to a standard 
the Supreme Court did not intend.  This immensely simplifies the 
judicial task, and creates a uniform choice for courts from all corners 
of the country that may face differing types of legislation.  The test set 
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forth in Marzzarella creates complication in an area already plagued 
with uncertainty; the Kavanaugh approach, on the other hand, creates 
a relatively uniform standard.  As Justice Breyer noted in dissent in 
McDonald, “judges do not know the answers to the kinds of 
empirically based questions that will often determine the need for 
particular forms of gun regulation.  Nor do they have readily available 
‘tools’ for finding and evaluating the technical material submitted by 
others.”219  Instead of requiring judges to engage in this form of 
analysis, the Kavanaugh approach allows judges to examine readily 
available text and historical material. 
D. The Kavanaugh Approach Is More Consistent with Supreme 
Court Precedent 
Above all other benefits, the Kavanaugh approach is the most loyal 
to the standards articulated by the Supreme Court in both Heller and 
McDonald.  As discussed in Part I, the Court in both instances 
seemed to reject a form of interest-balancing analysis for the Second 
Amendment.220  While the Court has been criticized for failing to 
articulate a standard of scrutiny for gun legislation (even from within 
its own ranks),221 the fact that it twice rejected the opportunity to do 
so indicates that such a standard is a poor fit.222  At the very least, the 
Court’s reluctance to choose intermediate or strict scrutiny cannot be 
seen as an invitation for lower courts to self-select.  What the Court 
did explicitly utilize in both cases, as Kavanaugh rightly focused upon, 
was the text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment.223  Nor 
would such a focus be out of bounds for constitutional analysis, as 
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2014] SECOND AMENDMENT REVIEW 1075 
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence shows by analogy.224  Indeed, the 
approach most consistent with Supreme Court precedent seems to be 
one that “depends upon a body of evidence susceptible of reasoned 
analysis rather than a variety of vague ethico-political First Principles 
whose combined conclusion can be found to point in any direction the 
judges favor.”225  The prime advantage of the Kavanaugh approach is 
its close adherence to the way the U.S. Supreme Court has 
consistently interpreted the Constitution. 
E. Applying the Kavanaugh Approach to High-Capacity 
Magazine Restrictions 
As with any proposed method of analysis, practical application 
often reveals the realistic benefits and flaws of forms of judicial 
reasoning that theoretical discussion may not touch upon.  As noted 
in Part II, high-capacity magazines present a variety of critical Second 
Amendment questions, and the constitutionality of laws restricting 
them remain far from clear.  This Note proposes that comparing the 
results of both the Kavanaugh approach and the popular Marzzarella 
test to laws banning high-capacity magazines demonstrates that 
examination based on “text, history, and tradition” produces a clear, 
predictable conclusion most faithful to the principles articulated in 
Heller and McDonald.226  Further, applying the Kavanaugh approach 
to the puzzling problems presented by high-capacity magazines 
presents an instructive example of the positive aspects of such 
analysis, as well as potential drawbacks and questions for future 
research. 
Under either approach, courts must first determine whether high-
capacity magazine restrictions impinge upon an individual’s Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.  If such restrictions do not intrude on 
those rights, under either form of examination, the analysis ends.  A 
particular regulation must impermissibly burden a Second 
Amendment right to be unconstitutional.227  To make this 
determination, it is useful for the court to define a law prohibiting the 
possession of high-capacity magazines as prohibiting or limiting.228  
                                                                                                                             
 224. Miller, supra note 39, at 929. 
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Prohibiting statutes are far more likely to undercut an individual’s 
fundamental right to keep and bear arms, and thus are immediately 
constitutionally suspect.229  Bans on high-capacity magazines must 
almost certainly fall into the category of prohibiting statutes.  Like the 
handgun ban in Miller, the absolute restriction on city firing ranges in 
Ezell, and the limitation on non-violent misdemeanant possession in 
Gowder, an embargo on magazines exceeding a certain size directly 
encroaches on an individual’s ability to engage in self-defense.230 
First, limitations on high-capacity magazines necessarily mean that 
no individual may possess a magazine exceeding as few as seven 
rounds.231  Consequently, in an emergency situation that person would 
be impeded by having to stop and re-load to fend off an attacker.232  
Such legislation makes no distinction between the home, where the 
right to self-defense is at its apex, and the outside world, where the 
Second Amendment is more open to manipulation.233  As such, laws 
banning magazines over a certain capacity—particularly when that 
number is low compared to the capacity of magazines in wide 
circulation in the United States—both directly affect and infringe 
upon an individual’s right to protect him or herself in his or her 
domicile.234  While it is certainly arguable that such legislation only 
adds “friction” to keeping and bearing firearms, this contention loses 
force when examined in light of the burden it places upon self-defense 
in the home.  Certainly, it is unlikely that an individual will need more 
than ten bullets to defend his or her property, but the scenario is far 
from inconceivable.235  Viewed in this light, laws restricting high-
capacity magazines most assuredly place a greater burden on self-
defense than other restrictions that courts have found constitutionally 
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troubling, like the ban on local firing ranges in Ezell.  Consequently, 
legislation eliminating the right to possess magazines of prevalent 
sizes236—like ten rounds—must be seen as prohibiting statutes 
impinging upon the Second Amendment. 
The next step in determining whether a law prohibiting high-
capacity magazines infringes upon individual Second Amendment 
rights is finding whether such legislation falls under one of the Heller 
exceptions.  As a threshold matter, high-capacity magazine bans do 
not fall into the “presumptively lawful” exception, as there is no 
longstanding American tradition of limiting magazines of roughly ten 
rounds.  While the Federal Assault Weapons Ban created such a 
magazine limit, it was not enacted until 1994, and expired without 
renewal only ten years later.237  This is a far cry from the century-old 
types of restrictions discussed under the “presumptively lawful” 
exception, such as laws prohibiting gun possession by felons or the 
mentally ill.238  While the list of “presumptively lawful” legislation in 
Heller was clearly not intended to be exhaustive, it was intended to 
exempt only well-established laws regulating firearms.239  Because 
there is no historical pattern of outlawing magazines approximating 
ten rounds, such a prohibition cannot realistically be said to be 
“presumptively lawful” according to the Supreme Court. 
The question of whether high-capacity magazines fall into the 
common use exception is a far more complex one.  To enjoy Second 
Amendment protection, high-capacity magazines cannot be qualified 
as either “dangerous” or “unusual.”240  Some form of objective 
assessment or comparison is necessary to determine whether 
magazines approximating ten rounds fall into one or both of these 
categories.  The United States Army Judge Advocate General Corps 
(JAG) conducted a useful study for this endeavor in 1997, and 
compared the lethality of the traditional shotgun, the rifle, and the 
machine gun in order to guide equipment selection in future combat 
operations.241  To a range of seventy-five yards, the shotgun clearly 
emerged as the deadliest of all options.242  At a range of thirty yards, 
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the probability of hitting a man-sized target with a shotgun is twice as 
good as assault rifles, and nearly twice as good as machine guns.243  
Further, the use of a shotgun at close range “increases the probability 
that targeted enemy combatants may be struck by more than a single 
projectile.”244  JAG concluded that even in the face of alternatives like 
the assault rifle and the machine gun, shotguns retain significant 
military necessity in the modern era.245  Further studies have 
consistently confirmed that semi-automatic assault rifles are 
“demonstrably inferior” from a lethality standpoint to shotguns.246 
Shotguns have enjoyed wide general approval from state 
legislatures; even the expansive ban imposed by the District in Heller 
permitted their use.247  No court examining a Second Amendment 
challenge has ever permitted a law restricting individual possession of 
the traditional shotgun.  Accordingly, it appears to be a valid 
conclusion that shotguns are not “dangerous” or “unusual” weapons 
to be prohibited by the common use test.  Objective analysis reveals 
that the shotgun is significantly more deadly at a seventy-yard range 
than a semi-automatic assault rifle, the type of weapon used in the 
Newtown and Aurora shootings.248  A traditional shotgun loaded with 
six rounds of 00 buckshot ammunition, which is both widely 
commercially available and commonly used for hunting,249 sends nine 
0.33-inch projectiles towards a target with a single trigger pull.250  A 
semi-automatic rifle sends only one bullet towards a target per trigger 
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pull.251  A shotgun loaded with six slugs sends fifty-four projectiles 
downrange with six trigger pulls; by contrast, a rifle loaded with a 
thirty-round magazine produces only thirty projectiles with thirty 
trigger pulls.  Thus, from this standpoint, even a rifle equipped with a 
magazine far exceeding ten rounds sends fewer projectiles towards a 
target with greater effort than the shotgun, which has been 
consistently legislatively sanctioned.  Though discussion of the 
relative lethality of shotguns and semi-automatic rifles loaded with 
any amount of ammunition may be difficult, states must make 
rational and constitutional discriminations when drafting gun laws.  
Because objective comparison demonstrates that even rifles equipped 
with very high-capacity magazines are less dangerous at close range 
than lawful shotguns, high-capacity magazines cannot logically fall 
into the “dangerous and unusual” category and out of the protective 
sphere of Heller. 
Since high-capacity magazines do not fall under the exceptions 
delineated by the Supreme Court, laws limiting them must be 
examined under the core principles of Heller to determine any 
Second Amendment infringement.  Under the Kavanaugh approach, 
this task is one both “narrow and constrained by precedent” for lower 
courts.252  Since high-capacity magazine restrictions of the type 
recently passed in many states are qualified as prohibiting statutes, a 
court must simply determine whether they are “sufficiently rooted in 
text, history, and tradition [as to be] consistent with the Second 
Amendment individual right.”253  Even cursory analysis reveals that 
legislative bans on ten-round magazines are hardly deeply rooted.  
The most significant recent regulation on high-capacity magazines 
was not passed until the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban, which 
expired in 2004 and did little to curb the use of assault weapons in 
violent crimes.254  Most states do not ban magazines with capacities as 
low as ten, and most firearms come factory-standard with magazines 
exceeding that size.255  Indeed, the popular AR-15 rifle has come 
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equipped with a standard thirty-round magazine since its introduction 
in 1963.256  Thus, as the Heller II majority had no trouble recognizing, 
there is no historical or traditional state restriction on magazines 
holding as few as ten rounds.257  Absent any showing of text, history, 
or tradition supporting high-capacity magazine bans, these laws 
clearly infringe upon individual Second Amendment rights under the 
Kavanaugh approach, and are constitutionally impermissible. 
F. Applying the Marzzarella Two-Step Test to High-Capacity 
Magazine Restrictions 
Under the Marzzarella approach, the constitutionality of high-
capacity magazine restrictions is far from clear, and hinges upon 
judicial discretion.  Interestingly, precise application of the test’s first 
step should be the end of the matter for high-capacity magazine 
restrictions, as they are prohibiting statutes that do not fall into a 
Heller exception and “impose[] a burden on conduct falling within 
the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”258  Nevertheless, a 
court utilizing the Marzzarella test could easily advance the analysis 
to the second step.  First, as discussed in Part I, high-capacity 
magazine bans can be framed as limiting statutes.259  As such, they 
would fall outside analysis under the common use test, and not pose a 
significant Second Amendment burden.  Second, many courts often 
advance challenged legislation to the second step when they are 
unsure about the statute’s survival at step one, and in some 
circumstances even when they feel that the question is resolvable 
without proceeding to step two.260  These factors combine to make it 
more likely than not that a court using the Marzzarella approach 
would subject high-capacity magazine restrictions to some form of 
heightened scrutiny. 
By far the most popular option for step two of the Marzzarella test 
is intermediate scrutiny, which requires courts to identify whether the 
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interest.261  Unlike the Kavanaugh approach, the issue of high-
capacity magazine bans surviving intermediate scrutiny is largely 
unpredictable and highly dependent on the court’s interpretation.  
Applying intermediate scrutiny in the Second Amendment context is 
particularly problematic because the test lacks the years of 
jurisprudence it has enjoyed in other contexts, such as the First 
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Some judges seem to apply intermediate scrutiny with a 
thumb on the legislature’s side of the scale, and some with an eye 
towards preservation of a strong Second Amendment right.262  
Accordingly, it is nearly impossible to say how a particular court 
would resolve a dispute over the constitutionality of high-capacity 
magazine restrictions when utilizing the Marzzarella approach. 
G. High-Capacity Magazine Restriction Hypotheticals Illustrate 
the Superiority of the Kavanaugh Approach 
The Kavanaugh approach, with its demonstrable predictability of 
outcome, is not only favorable but more faithful to the principles 
articulated by the Supreme Court.  First, and most importantly, the 
Court has twice rejected interest-balancing analysis for Second 
Amendment cases.263  Judge Ginsburg addressed this obstacle in 
Heller II by concluding that intermediate scrutiny is not a form of 
interest-balancing, but a simple “assessment of whether a particular 
law will serve an important or compelling governmental interest.”264  
Despite this ready definition, analysis of the government’s interest in 
enacting gun legislation is precisely the type of “judge-empowering 
interest-balancing inquiry” that the Supreme Court sought to actively 
bar.265  Further, the Heller Court implicitly addressed and denied the 
application of intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases by 
rejecting Justice Breyer’s approval of the test: “[T]he very 
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enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government . . . the 
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really 
worth insisting upon.  A constitutional guarantee subject to future 
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at 
all.”266  The Marzzarella approach simply adds judicial discretion to an 
already sound evaluation of whether given legislation significantly 
impedes individual Second Amendment rights.  Because Heller’s 
approach takes interest balancing off the table, laws burdening the 
individual Second Amendment rights that do not fall into one of the 
two specified exceptions are impermissible.  As the Heller Court 
would likely find high-capacity magazine restrictions unconstitutional, 
the clear directive of the Kavanaugh approach is demonstrably more 
consistent with the core of the Second Amendment interpretation 
established by the Supreme Court. 
H. Unresolved Problems Surrounding the Kavanaugh Approach 
The Kavanaugh approach is not without flaws.  Because it is 
grounded in past interpretation of the Second Amendment, it fails to 
provide a clear roadmap for dealing with advancements in firearms 
technology.  The most significant problem the Kavanaugh approach 
neglects is the circularity problem.  Here, this Note returns to the 
hypothetical posed in Part II regarding after-market high-capacity 
magazines with a reduced probability of jamming.  State legislatures 
are ostensibly free to ban these types of magazines, preventing them 
from emerging into common use among American citizens.  Despite 
their similarity (or improvement over) traditional after-market 
magazines, laws regulating these products would qualify as limiting 
statutes out of the reach of the common use test.267  While a court 
could theoretically stretch the Kavanaugh approach to encompass 
these types of magazines based on comparison to those in current use, 
they would certainly not enjoy the kind of protection that should be 
afforded to their outdated counterparts.  Further, the point where 
technological advancement pushes a particular product into a new 
category—one fully distinguishable from what currently exists on the 
market—is an imprecise, easily manipulated line.  For instance, is a 
seven-round magazine that can be constructed at home from a 3D 
printer permissible?268  Is one imbued with laser target assistance or 
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balancing technology sufficiently dissimilar to current magazines as to 
be capable of stricter regulation?  Because the Kavanaugh approach 
focuses solely on the “text, history, and tradition” of the Second 
Amendment, it is not equipped to deal with the questions raised by 
new products, and could serve to stymie both courts and 
manufacturers through legal development in firearms technology. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the Kavanaugh approach’s analytical appeal, most federal 
courts have declined to accept it.269  The Supreme Court’s consistent 
failure to articulate a standard for Second Amendment challenges has 
left lower courts floundering, reaching for questionable tests like the 
one articulated in Marzzarella to fill the void.  By embracing interest-
balancing, courts also embrace precisely the problems the Heller 
Court intended to ward against.  In contrast, the Kavanaugh approach 
directly supports the text, history, and tradition of the Second 
Amendment that the Supreme Court intended to take into account.  
The puzzling problems raised by high-capacity magazine restrictions 
perfectly illustrate the benefits of the Kavanaugh approach, and pose 
important questions for the future.  Through careful analysis and 
adherence to precedent, courts and legislatures will be able to most 
effectively approach the difficult issues raised by modern Second 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
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